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CANADA UPDATE-HIGHLIGHTS OF
MAJOR LEGAL NEWS AND SIGNIFICANT
COURT CASES FROM JANUARY 2010
THROUGH APRIL 2010
Andrew C Brown*
1. SUMMARY OF LEGAL NEWS
A. CANADIAN GOVERNMENT To FAST-TRACK HAITIAN IMMIGRATIONIN response to the devastating earthquake that hit Haiti on January
12, 2010, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (GIG) announced new
measures relating to the immigration of Haitian nationals to the
country. The new measures also addressed the status of Haitians already
residing in Canada on a temporary basis.
Effective as of January 16, 2010, GIG will give priority to "new and
existing sponsorship applications from Canadian citizens, permanent re-
sidents and protected persons who have close family members in Haiti."'
In order to benefit from this program, however, those applying for special
priority must identify themselves as having been "directly and signifi-
cantly affected" by the earthquake and its aftermath. 2 The procedures
for priority immigration status will also extend to pending adoptions of
Haitian children.3 Interested persons filing new sponsorship applications
should prominently and clearly write "Haiti" on the mailing envelope. 4
In addition to the fast-tracking of new and existing immigration appli-
cations from Haiti, the GIG is allowing Haitian nationals who are in Ca-
nada on a temporary basis to extend their visas.5 According to the GIG,
extensions will be processed according to normal procedures, but the pro-
cess for Haitian nationals will be expedited and any filing fees will be
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waived.6
While the announcement of the new expedited immigration procedures
was welcomed by Haitian nationals in Canada, some expressed concern
about the difficulty of processing the requests. A Haitian community or-
ganizer in Montreal, Chantal Barratteau, told the CBC news service that
deciding which requests to honor and which to deny will likely prove to
be a difficult task for immigration officials.7
B. MONTREAL FINANCIER SENTENCED FOR PoNZI SCHEME
On February 15, 2010, Earl Jones, a Montreal financial advisor, was
sentenced to eleven years in prison after pleading guilty in January to two
counts of fraud related to a $50 million Ponzi scheme he had orches-
trated.8 Jones' scheme spanned more than twenty years and victimized
nearly 160 people, including many of his own friends and family.9
Since both Jones and the financial-services company that he operated
have been declared bankrupt, many of his victims applied with the court
for leave to file a lawsuit against the Royal Bank of Canada to recover
the money Jones stole.' 0 The Court granted the victims leave in early
February and they subsequently filed a $40 million class action lawsuit.'
Jones operated his business through a personal account he had with the
bank-an account that he misrepresented to his investors as "in-trust."12
Recent documents uncovered by the investigation revealed that RBC
knew of suspicious activity related to Jones' account and had previously
warned him that he could possibly get into trouble for misrepresenting
the account as "in-trust."' 3 RBC, however, did nothing to stop Jones
from continuing to use his account as usual.14 Many of Jones' investors
were duped because Jones had used RBC's letterhead and logo when cor-
responding with them, which gave an appearance of legitimacy to his
scheme.' 5 According to the class action lawsuit, if not for "the negligence
and willful blindness of the Royal Bank of Canada," Jones would not
have been able to successfully carry out his scheme for so long.'6 As of
the date of this update, the class-action lawsuit against RBC has not yet
6. Id.
7. Canada May Fast-Track Haitian Immigration, CBC NEws, Jan. 16, 2010, http://
www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2010/01/15/haiti-canada-immigration.html.
8. Earl Jones Gets 11 Years for $50M Fraud, CBC News, Feb. 15, 2009, http://www.
cbc.ca/canadalmontreal/story/2010/02/15/earl-jones-sentenced-ponzi.html.
9. Id.; see also RBC Knew of Jones Account Oddity, Memo Shows, CBC Niiws, Feb.
5, 2010, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2010/02/04/earl-jones-bank-memo769.html
#ixzz0ehFypsWY.
10. See Earl Jones Gets 11 Years for $50M Fraud, supra note 4.
11. Paul Delean, Earl Jones Victim Sues Royal Bank, MONTREAL GAzuirrEi, Feb. 6,
2010, http://www.montrealgazette.com/Earl+Jones+victim+sues+Royal+Bank/253
0581/story.html.




16. See Paul Delean, supra note 11.
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been tried, however, some of Jones' victims have managed to recover
their investments via other outside procedures.' 7
C. PROPOSED LEGISLATION WOULD INCREASE NUMBER OF
REFUGEES ACCEPTED BY CANADA
In March, the Canadian government proposed sweeping reforms to the
country's refugee program that, if passed by Parliament, would increase
the number of United Nations approved refugees that it accepts each
year.' 8 The proposal would expand the Government-Assisted Refugees
Program by up to 500 places over time and the Private Sponsorship of
Refugees Program by 2,000 places, for a total of 2,500 new refugees ad-
mitted annually.' 9
Under the Government-Assisted Refugees Program, the Canadian
government (through CIC-supported non-governmental organizations)
provides full support for refugees admitted into Canada for up to one
year or until the refugee is able to support herself, whichever is sooner.20
The support covers expenses related to relocation as well as necessaries
for everyday life, including food, shelter, and clothing.2' The Private
Sponsorship of Refugees Program is funded by Canadian citizens and
permanent residents who wish to get help bring refugees to Canada. 22 As
opposed to the Government-Assisted Refugees Program, all the funding
for the refugees under Private Sponsorship comes from individuals or
groups.23 The sponsors commit to providing financial assistance that cov-
ers the same necessaries as the Government-Assisted program covers,
but coverage under Private Sponsorship may be extended for up to thirty-
six months rather than the year allowed under the government pro-
gram.24 In order to qualify under both programs, refugees must qualify
as refugees under the United Nations 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and meet the requirements for entry into Canada
under Canada's Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.25
It is estimated that the program, once fully implemented, will help as
17. Anne Sutherland, Earl Jones' Victims Start to Recover Funds, MONrREAi- GA-
ziETUE-, Apr. 20, 2010, http://www.montrealgazette.com/business/Earl+Jones+vic-
tims+start+recover+funds/2927795/story.htm.
18. Elizabeth Thompson, Kenney Launches Refugee Reform, ToiZONTO SUN, Mar. 30,
2010, http://www.torontosun.com/news/canada/2010/03/29/1 3394081-qmi.html.
19. Press Release, CIC, Expanding Canada's Refugee Resettlement Programs (Mar.
29, 2010), http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/releases/201 0/2010-03-29.
asp.
20. Government-Assisted Refugee Program, CIC, Sept. 1, 2005, http://www.cic.gc.ca/
english/refugees/outside/resettle-gov.asp.
21. Id.




25. See Government-Assisted Refugee Program, supra note 20; see also Sponsoring
Refugees: Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program, supra note 22.
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many as 14,500 refugees resettle in Canada. 26 Additionally, the cost of
the expansion over the next five years is will be approximately $90 mil-
lion with another $21 million increase in ongoing funding.27
11. RECENT SIGNIFICANT COURT DECISIONS
A. TECHRON CONTRACTORS LTD. v. BRITISH
COLUMBIA 2 8 -EXCLUSION CLAUSES
Techron Contractors Ltd. V. British Columbia concerned an exclusion
clause included in a contract for the design and construction of a highway.
The Province of British Columbia (B.C.) wanted to build a new highway
and issued a "request for expression of interest" for its design and con-
struction. 29 Six companies responded to the initial request. Following
this response, B.C. decided that it wanted to handle the design portion of
the project and contract out the construction. B.C. informed the six com-
panies of this change and asked them each to submit a proposal for the
construction. According to the terms of the contract, only the six original
companies would be eligible to submit a proposal for construction. Also
included in the contract was the following exclusion of liability clause:
Except as expressly and specifically permitted in these Instructions
to Proponents, no Proponent shall have any claim for any compensa-
tion of any kind whatsoever, as a result of participating in this RFP
["Request for Proposals"], and by submitting a proposal each propo-
nent shall be deemed to have agreed that it has no claim.3 0
Brentwood, one of the original six companies that expressed interest in
the original design and construction plan, entered into a "pre-bidding
agreement" with another company that was not a part of the six compa-
nies authorized to bid on the project. Under the terms of this agreement,
Brentwood would be the primary contractor on the job and the new com-
pany would be subcontracted the drilling and blasting work. Ultimately,
Brentwood won the project and the second-place company, Tercon, filed
suit against B.C. for accepting the bid from Brentwood's joint venture
alleging that it violated the terms of the agreement by limiting bidding to
the original six companies.
The Trial Court ruled in favor of Tercon, finding that B.C.'s breach was
fundamental and not barred by the exclusion clause contained the con-
tract. The Court of Appeal, however, reversed the Trial Court and found
that the exclusion clause "was clear and unambiguous and barred com-
pensation for all defaults."13'
The Supreme Court of Canada reversed the Trial Court's decision by a
5-4 decision and held that B.C. had breached the contract by accepting
26. See Elizabeth Thompson, supra note 18.
27. Id.
28. Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. British Columbia, [2010] SCC 4, at 3 (Can.).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 4.
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bids from, and ultimately awarding the contract to, companies that were
not eligible to bid on the project (the company that Brentwood con-
tracted with).32 Additionally, the SCC held that the existence of the ex-
clusion clause in the contract did not bar Tercon's suit for damages
against B.C.33
Although the Court was divided on the question of whether the exclu-
sion clause applied, it was unanimous on the standard of interpretation
that should be applied in analyzing such clauses. When a plaintiff wishes
to challenge an exclusion clause or other contractual term that it had pre-
viously agreed to, the Court will follow a three-step framework for deter-
mining whether the plaintiff should be allowed to escape the challenged
term. First, the Court will consider whether the exclusion clause even
applies to "the circumstances established in evidence."134 If the clause ap-
plies, the Court will then determine if the clause was unconscionable,
which would render the entire contract invalid from the time of formation
and end the inquiry. But if the clause both applies and is valid, the Court
will consider whether it "should nevertheless refuse to enforce the exclu-
sion clause because of an overriding public policy."13 5 In all cases, the
Court noted that the burden lies on the party challenging the clause to
"demonstrate an abuse of the freedom of contract that outweighs the
very strong public interest in their enforcement."13 6
In applying the framework to the exclusion clause at issue, the majority
found that the specific breach alleged by Tercon, that B.C. had accepted
bids from ineligible bidders and thus violated the contract, was not cov-
ered by the terms of the exclusion clause.37 Specifically, the Court cites
the language in the exclusion clause applying it to claims "arising as a
result of participating in [the] pJFPp"38 According to the express terms of
the contract, the bidding process would be limited to the original six com-
panies that responded to the initial request. 3 9 Thus, the Court held that
the participation of "other ineligible parties" was a claim that, by its na-
ture, lay outside of the coverage of the exclusion clause.40
The dissent noted that the primary conflict in this case was between
"the public policy that favors a fair, open and transparent bidding pro-
cess, and the freedom of contract of sophisticated parties and experienced
parties in a commercial environment to craft their own contractual rela-
tions."14' Although the dissent agreed that B.C. had breached the terms
of the agreement by contracting with Brentwood while knowing that the
work would actually be carried out by a joint venture of Brentwood and
32. Id. at 5.
33. Id.
34. Tercon, [20101 SCC 4, at 5.
35. Id
36. Id.
37. Id. at 37-38.
38. Id. at 38.
39. Id. at 43.
40. Tercon, [2010] SCC 4, at 38.
41. Id. at 49.
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an ineligible bidder, it found that B.C.'s breach was not fundamental to
the overall contract and that any conflict should be resolved in favor of
freedom of contract since all the parties involved were sophisticated in
the subject matter .4 2 Ultimately, however, B.C. was found to have
breached the agreement and Tercon was awarded damages. 43
B. R v. NASOGALUAK 4 4 -MINIMUM SENTENCES CAN BE LOWERED
The Supreme Court of Canada ruled that, in exceptional circumstances
where a person's rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms (hereinafter "Charter"), judges are empowered to reduce the sen-
tence below the mandatory minimum prescribed by statute .45 The case
centered on the 2004 arrest of Lyle Nasogaluak for drunk driving and
fleeing police. 46 During the arrest, members of the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (RCMP) knocked Nasogaluak to the ground and struck
him twice in the ribs resulting in several broken ribs and a punctured
lung.47
Nasogaluak pled guilty to the drunk driving charge, but the judge
found that police had used excessive force, thus violating Nasogaluak's
rights under the Charter, and reduced his sentence below what otherwise
would have been imposed in accordance with Section 24(1) of the Char-
ter.4 8 According to the terms of Sec. 24(1), "any whose rights or free-
doms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may
apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain SUCH REMEDY AS THE
COURT CONSIDERS APPROPRIATE AND JUST IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES."14 9
The Supreme Court of Canada's decision focused on what would consti-
tute an "appropriate" remedy within the meaning of Sec. 24( 1).50
Although the Court of Appeal agreed that there was sufficient evi-
dence to show that the police had used excessive force and violated Naso-
galuak's rights under the Charter, they found that the judge did not have
the discretion to reduce the sentence below the statutory mandated mini-
mum.5 ' The Supreme Court of Canada reversed the Court of Appeal
holding that judges have broad discretion in sentencing and, in certain
exceptional cases, may reduce a sentence below the statutorily mandated
minimums .52 According to the Court, these exceptional cases generally
42. Id. at 49-53.
43. Id. at 46.
44. R. v. Nasogaluak, [2010] SCC 6, at 4.




48. Nasogaluak, [2010] SCC 6, at 4.
49. Constitution Act Part 1, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982, Sec.
24(l) (U.K.) (emphasis added).
50. Nasogaluak, [20101 SCC 6, at 3.
51. Id. at 4.
52. Id. at 7.
2010] CANA DA UPDA TE60
arise when the constitutionality of the limit itself is challenged. 53
Ultimately, while the Court recognized that a judge may reduce a sen-
tence below the mandatory minimum, it declined to apply such power in
this case.54 While the Court affirmed the trial judge's holding that the
police had used excessive force and recognized that the judge may take
this into account when issuing a sentence, it also found that this case was
not one of the "exceptional" cases in which a judge may reduce a sen-
tence below the statutory minimum.55 Accordingly, it upheld the Court
of Appeal's substitution of conditional discharge with the minimum fine
mandated by the statute.56
C. R v. CUNNINGHAM 5 7 -AT-rORNEY COMPELLED TO
REPRESENT CLIENT
R. v. Cunningham concerned whether a court can compel criminal de-
fense attorneys to represent a client who cannot pay the legal fees owed.
Cunningham was a defense lawyer employed by Yukon Legal Aid who
was assigned to represent a defendant charged with sexual offenses
against a child.58 As a condition of obtaining legal aid, the defendant was
required to update his financial records or risk having his representation
suspended.5" The defendant failed to meet this obligation and Yukon Le-
gal Aid suspended his funding. Cunningham subsequently petitioned the
Territorial Court to allow her to withdraw as counsel on the sole basis of
the suspension of the defendant's funding. 60 Her request was denied by
both the Territorial Court and the Supreme Court of the Yukon Territory,
but was ultimately allowed by the Court of Appeal, which found that the
Territorial Court did not have the discretion to refuse Cunningham's ap-
plication to withdraw.61
The Court of Appeal held that courts should not compel attorneys to
continue to represent clients who cannot pay for legal services. 62 It based
its decision on three primary factors. First, that court oversight of with-
drawal petitions could cause an unreasonable conflict between the court's
decision and any disciplinary action taken by law societies, which hold the
primary interest in the regulation and oversight of attorneys.63 Second,
the Court of Appeal held that judicial oversight of attorney withdrawal
could jeopardize the solicitor-client privilege when the attorney may be
53. Id at 12.
54. Id at 12-13.
55. Id at 13.
56. Nasogaluak, [2010] SCC 6, at 13.
57. R. v. Cunningham, [2010] SCC 10, at 3.




62. Supreme Court Hears Yukon Legal Aid Case, (JBC NE~WS NORTH, Nov. 17, 2010,
h ttp://www.cbc.ca/canada/northstory/2009/1 1/17/yukon -legal -scoc. htm 1.
63. Cunningham, [2010] SCC 10, at 11.
2010] 609
610 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 16
compelled to disclose the reasons for wishing to withdraw.64 Finally, a
compelled representation could create a conflict between the client's best
interests and the attorney's desire to reach a swift resolution.65 Accord-
ingly, the Court of Appeal advocated a hands-off approach in which it
would assume that attorneys will generally not try to avoid their duties to
their clients.66 If they do, however, the Court of Appeal thought it best
to leave the discipline of such attorneys to the discretion of the law
societies. 67
In its ruling, the Supreme Court of Canada reversed the Court of Ap-
peal and reinstated the determination made by the Supreme Court of the
Yukon Territory that the Territorial Court did, in fact, have the discretion
to compel Cunningham to continue the representation despite the re-
moval of legal aid funding. 68 The SCC was careful to note that while a
judge does have the authority to compel an attorney to continue to re-
present an accused, such authority must only be exercised "only when
necessary to prevent serious harm to the administration of justice."169
This decision answered a question that had divided courts across Ca-
nada. 70 Justice Marshall Rothstein, writing for the majority, based his
decision primarily on the "inherent jurisdiction" of courts.7 ' According
to Rothstein, "inherent jurisdiction includes the authority to control the
process of the court, prevent abuses of process, and ensure the machinery
of the court functions in an orderly and effective manner."172 Since attor-
neys are a vital component of this "machinery of the court," a court may
"4exercise some control over counsel when necessary to protect its
process."173
The predominant standard for a court's refusal of an attorney's request
for withdrawal, as articulated by the SCC in this case, is "whether al-
lowing the withdrawal would cause serious harm to the administration of
justice."174 The Court then laid out several factors for judges to consider
when answering this question including the feasibility of the accused rep-
resenting himself or herself; other means for the client to obtain repre-
sentation; the impact of the resulting delay in the proceedings on the
accused, especially if the accused is incarcerated during the pendency of
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 11-12.
67. Id.
68. Id. at S.
69. Cunningham, [2010] SCC 10, at 9.
70. Id. at 13-16 (Noting the divergent lines of authority on the issue among provincial
and territorial courts. The British Columbia and Yukon Territory Courts of Ap-
peal have held that a judge does not have the authority to prevent a defense attor-
ney from withdrawing representation based on non-payment of legal fees, while
the Courts of Appeal of Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec
have all held that the judge may refuse counsel's petition for withdrawal).
71. Id. at 16.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 30.
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the proceeding; the conduct of counsel in seeking withdrawal; the impact
of granting the withdrawal on the Crown and any other co-defendants;
the impact on complainants, witnesses, and jurors; fairness to the defense
counsel, taking into account the length and complexity of the case; and
the history of the matter.75 These standards, like many others designed
to guide judicial decision making, are not exhaustive, but provide a basic
framework for the exercise of the judicial discretion to refuse counsel's
request for withdrawal.
D. MINING WATCH CANADA V. CANADA 7 6 (FISHERIES AND OCEANS)
In a case testing the extent of the federal government's obligations
under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, the Supreme Court
of Canada ruled that future development projects must go through full
environmental screening before moving forward."7 The case focused on a
mining company's petition to the British Columbia Environmental As-
sessment Office (the Office) for the establishment of an open pit copper
and gold mine.78 Following the submission of the project, the Office
sought public comment on the project and conduced an initial environ-
mental screening of the plan, but determined that a full study would not
be required because it was unlikely that the project would cause "signifi-
cant adverse, environmental, heritage, social, economic or health ef-
fects."179 The project was approved and MiningWatch Canada, a mining
industry watchdog, brought suit challenging the decision by the Office to
conduct a screening rather than a comprehensive review.80
The Federal Court ruled in favor of MiningWatch and held that the
Office had breached its duty to conduct a comprehensive review under
the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act and prohibited further ac-
tion on the mine until the review could be completed.81 The Court of
Appeal, however, reversed the Federal Court's decision and the case was
appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The SCC's decision in this case was mixed. Although the Supreme
Court agreed with MiningWatch that the Office had breached its duty
under the CEAA, it also held that because Mining Watch had "no propri-
etary or pecuniary interest in outcome of the proceedings" the mining
operation could move forward despite the failure of the Office to conduct
the necessary assessments.82 Although the SCC allowed the mining pro-
ject to continue, its decision ultimately stands for the proposition that the
75. Cunningham. [2010] SCC 10, at 30.
76. MiningWatch Canada v. Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), [2010] SCC 2, at 1.
77. See, e.g., Ottawa Erred on B.C. Mine Review: Court, CBC NEWS, Jan. 21, 2010,
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/british-columbia/story/201 0/01 /21/bc-red-chris-mine-su-
preme-court.html.
78. Mining Watch, [2010] SCC 2, at 4.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 5.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 5-7; Ottawa Erred on B.C. Mine Review: Court, supra note 77.
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procedures outlined in the CEAA for the approval of projects that may
be harmful to the environment are mandatory and must be followed in all
instances by federal authorities.
